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THE FEDERAL APPROACH-SCOPE AND
AVAILABILITY OF SECTION 2255
I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio recently adopted a new post-conviction remedy procedure'
which it is hoped will tope with the vexatious habeas corpus problems
now confronting many states as well as the federal judiciary. How-
ever, as with any post-conviction procedure, two conflicting interests
exist. On the one hand, there is the need of fulfilling the societal goal
of basic fair play in criminal matters. This demands an adequate
opportunity for post-conviction review for those whose rights have
been abused at trial. On the other hand, there is the necessity of
filtering out the many unfounded claims upon which valuable time
and effort is being lost. The frivolous habeas corpus petition can cause
a secondary reaction to the immediate one of dismissal of the petition.
Too many unfounded claims, clogging the dockets of the reviewing
courts, can lead to a negative attitude toward post-conviction relief
in general. This can then result in the drying up of available modes of
relief to the abused as well as to the writ-abuser. The court is faced
with a dilemma as practical as time, and as idealistic as the concept of
justice. How the judge resolves the program has important ramifications
in a society constitutionally pledged to due process.2
Now that the Ohio legislature has attempted to find a new solution
to the problem, Ohio judges will be called upon to add substantive
content to this new legislation. It may prove helpful to look at how
I Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1965).
2 Mr. Justice Schaefer, of the Supreme Court of Illinois, reached the heart of the
matter when he admonished:
It has been said of the habeas corpus cases that one who searches for a needle
in a haystack is likely to conclude that the needle is not worth the effort. That
emphasis distorts the picture. Even with the narrowest focus it is not a needle
we are looking for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human being.
And if the perspective is broadened, even the significance of that single human
being diminishes, and we begin to catch a glimpse of the full picture. The aim
which justifies the existence of habeas corpus is not fundamentally different from
that which informs our criminal law in general, that it is better that a guilty
man go free than an innocent one be punished. To the extent that the small num-
ber of meritorious petitions shows that the standards of due process are being
honored in criminal trials we should be gratified; but the continuing availability
of the federal remedy is in large part responsible for that result. What is in-
volved, however, is not just the enforcement of defined standards. It is also
the creative process of writing specific content into the highest of our. ideals.
So viewed, the burdensome task of sifting the meritorious from the worthless
appears less futile, and there is less room for the emotions of federalism.
Schaefer, "Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25-26 (1956).
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other jurisdictions have met the problem with legislation, and how
that legislation has been interpreted. Analogy is not lacking. Since
1948 federal prisoners have had available the section 2255 motion as
a post-conviction remedy.3
Much of the statutory language of the Ohio legislation and sec-
tion 2255 is similar. Both provide that the remedy is available to a
"prisoner in custody under sentence," that such motion can be made
at any time, that the motion is to be directed to the sentencing court
(as opposed to the court in whose jurisdiction the prisoner is incar-
cerated, which is the proper jurisdiction for habeas corpus relief),
and that the court is "not required to entertain successive motions for
similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." Both allow the reviewing
court to discharge the prisoner or correct the sentence through re-
sentencing, and provide that the prisoner need not always be produced
at the hearing on the motion.
3 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1965) reads as follows:
Section 2255:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise sub-,
ject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to
be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with re-
spect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without juris-
diction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise
open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement
of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable
to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or suc-
cessive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on
the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffec-
tive to test the legality of his detention.
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There are some marked differences between the statutes which
must also be considered. Whereas the Ohio statute provides only one
ground for relief, i.e., "infringement of rights as to render the judg-
ment void or voidable" under the state or federal constitutions, the
federal motion allows the prisoner to test his conviction by raising
not only constitutional questions but also questions relating to (1) the
validity of the sentence in light of federal laws, (2) the excessiveness
of the punishment, (3) the jurisdiction of the court to impose the
sentence, and (4) whether the conviction is subject to "collateral
attack." The Ohio statute makes the constitutional ground raisable in
terms of the sentence being "void or voidable." Though both provide
for a hearing unless the prisoner is not entitled to relief, in federal
court the motion and files and records must conclusively show that the
prisoner is not so entitled to relief; whereas, in Ohio, the records need
not be conclusive.4
Though the Ohio statute is not a duplication of the federal motion,
there are sufficient similarities in the choice of certain sentences and
phrases to make inquiry into judicial interpretation of the federal
motion by federal courts quite helpful to the Ohio judge. To the
extent the legislation is similar, the Ohio -judge may very well deem
the legislators' choice of wordage as approval of prior federal con-
struction.5
Turning, then, to the federal courts' judicial construction of
section 2255, two main questions are dealt with in the following dis-
cussion: first, the scope of the federal motion, and second, the standing
of the federal prisoner to raise his objections to his conviction.
II. SCOPE
A. The Federal Context of Remedies
The federal prisoner has many statutory avenues which allow
him to present many types of questions concerning his conviction either
to the trial court or to an appellate court.' Although some of these
4 See Herman, "Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies: Foreword and Afterword,"
27 Ohio St. L.J. 237, 239 (1966).
5 See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Nadler, 115 Ohio St. 472, 476, 154 N.E. 736,
738 (1926), where the court said: "Where a statute is adopted from another state, which,
previous to such adoption, had been construed by the court of that state, it is presumed
to have been adopted with the construction so given it." See also James v. Appel, 192
U.S. 129, 135 (1904); Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 264, 280 (1831); Steel-
workers v. Doyle, 150 N.E.2d 334, 355 (Ohio C.P. 1958); 2 Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction 551-55 (3d ed. 1943).
6 The battery of federal remedies includes:
(1) Appeal of the conviction to question errors at trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 37(a).
(2) Motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) in the sentencing court to withdraw
[Vol. 27
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procedures have definitely limited functions and have been interpreted
so as not to be expandable beyond their statutory language or com-
mon-law scope,7 an air of liberality generally prevails in the federal
courts concerning the procedural aspects of the post-conviction
remedies. The various remedies have been allowed to be interchanged
for one another when the federal prisoner has a substantial claim but
has used the wrong procedure for correcting the abuse. For example,
even though rule 34 is held to its strict statutory language,' direct
appeal has been liberally administered to the degree that it has been
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere after judgment of conviction to prevent manifest
injustice. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) states: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of
nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence
is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
(3) Motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 for new trial within five days after verdict on
grounds other than newly discovered evidence, for which the period is two years.
(4) Motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 34 in arrest of judgment within five days on the
grounds that the indictment or information does not charge an offense or that the court
was without jurisdiction of the offense charged.
(5) Motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 to correct an illegal sentence, which may be
made at any time; or reduce the sentence, which must be made within sixty days.
(6) Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the jurisdiction of incarceration to test the
legality of detention when § 2255 proves inadequate.
(7) Petition for a writ of error coram nobis to correct errors of fact. See United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
(8) Motion under § 2255 in the sentencing court.
7 See Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1957), which held that the
purpose of rules 45(c), 33, 34, 35, 36 was to meet the problems of jurisdiction of federal
courts to correct an illegal sentence after expiration of the term at which it was entered.
The court said at 483: "It was not their [the rules'] purpose to meet the problems
involved in habeas corpus proceedings or a collateral attack upon a judgment."
8 In United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1949), judge Learned Hand
said at 741-42:
Rule 34 is explicit as to the grounds upon which a motion in arrest of judgment
will lie: (1) The indictment must fail to "charge an offense," or (2) the court
must be "without jurisdiction of the offense charged." . . . the appellee is right in
saying that at common-law a motion in arrest of judgment raised no objections
which did not appear "upon the face of the record." ... The "face of the
record" includes nothing more than the judgment roll .... For this reason it was
held before the Rules that upon appeal any ruling whose validity depended upon
the evidence taken at the trial, was not reviewable by motion in arrest; and the
Rules have made no change. The Criminal Appeals Act spoke to the law, as it
then was; it used the phrase, "motion in arrest of judgment," as it had come
down from the past....
[Footnotes omitted.] See also United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952), cert. denied, 347 U.. 945 (1954) (limiting rule 34 to the
"record").
1966]
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held to be a matter of right,' with full opportunity given to the
indigent.10 But narrower or broader construction of each federal
remedy itself is not as crucial as is the determination of the prisoner's
rights within the context of the total battery of remedies available.
Where relief could have been denied on the grounds that the prisoner
proceeded under the wrong remedy, the federal courts have instead
heeded the Supreme Court's directive in United States v. Morgan:1
"In behalf of the unfortunates, federal courts should act in doing
justice if the record makes plain a right to relief."'" Thus a motion
under section 2255 may be treated as a petition for writ of error coram
nobis; 13 a "Motion for Dismissal of Sentence and Reversal of Verdict"
which had been denied below as a section 2255 motion may be treated
as a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
under rule 33 and a hearing granted; 14 a motion under section 2255
may be treated as a motion under rule 35 when that would be the
proper remedy;" and when the rules are of no avail because of their
9 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). The Court said at 441-42:
Present federal law has made an appeal from a District Court's judgment of con-
viction in a criminal case, what is, in effect, a matter of right [citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1965), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)]. That is, a defendant has a right to
have his conviction reviewed by a Court of Appeals, and need not petition that
court for an exercise of its discretion to allow him to bring the case before the
court. The only requirements a defendant must meet for perfecting his appeal are
those expressed as time limitations within which various procedural steps must
be completed. First, a timely notice of appeal must be filed in the District Court
to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals over the case.
10 Id. at 444-45. The Court said:
The sole statutory language by which the District Court is guided in passing
upon the application provides "an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis
if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a).... What meaning should be placed on the "good faith" of which the
statute speaks? In the context of a criminal appeal, we do not believe it can be
read to require a District Court to determine whether the would-be appellant
seeks further review of his case in subjective good faith. . . . We hold, instead,
that "good faith" in this context must be judged by an objective standard. We
consider a defendant's good faith in 'this type of case demonstrated when he
seeks appellate review of any issue not frivolous.
11 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
12 Id. at 505.
Is Ibid.
14 Mitchell v. United States, 368 U.S. 439 (1962) (per curiam).
15 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962); Hefin v. United States, 358 U.S.
415, 418 (1959) ; see also Young v. United States, 337 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964), where the
court stated:
[W]e ought not to follow the rule stated in Crow v. United States, 9th Cir.,
1950, 186 F.2d 704, where the court refused to treat a motion under Section
2255 as an application for relief under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(d) .... Rather,
we would adopt the practice of the Tenth Circuit which has said that "A
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built-in time limitations,1" the Court suggests the availability of
collateral attack.' It is this interchangeability among the remedies at
the higher levels of judicial administration, this proclivity to make the
proper avenue of redress available after the issues have been drawn
around the improper one, that makes federal post-conviction relief a
viable reality. The result is the granting of a hearing to determine
the facts upon which the prisoner brings his complaint, with a cor-
responding increase in the work-load of the district court.' 8
Section 2255 motion can be treated as an application for a writ of coram nobis,
and the validity of the sentence may then be tested, in an appropriate case.
Igo v. United States, 10th Cir., 1962, 303 F.2d 317, 318."
16 In refusing to accept excusable neglect as a basis for extending the time limitation
for appeal under rule 37(a) (2), the Court in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220
(1960), said at 225:
If ... delayed Mling of notice of appeal-found to have resulted from "excusable
neglect"-is sufficient to confer jurisdiction of the appeal, it would consistently
follow that a District Court may, upon a like finding, permit delayed filing of a
motion for a new trial under Rule 33, of a motion in arrest of judgment under
Rule 34, and the reduction of sentence under Rule 35, at any time-months or
even years-after expiration of the periods presented in those Rules ....
The Court said further at 230 that "Certainly that possibility would unnecessarily produce
intolerable uncertainty and confusion."
17 The Court in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 230 n.14, said:
The allowance of an appeal months or years after expiration of the prescribed
times seems unnecessary for the accomplishment of substantial justice, for there
are a number of collateral remedies available to redress denial of basic rights.
Examples are: The power of a District Court under Rule 35 to correct an illegal
sentence at any time, and to reduce a sentence within 60 days after the judgment
of conviction becomes final; the power of a District Court to entertain a
collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction and to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and proceedings by way of writ of error
coram nobis.
But see Berman v. United States, 378 U.S. 530 (1964), where the Court affirmed per
curiam the denial of an appeal. The petitioner presented a constitutional ground for
attack, i.e., illegal search and seizure. His attorney became ill and did not file the notice
of appeal due on Saturday until the following Monday. Mr. Justice Black, in a dissenting
opinion joined in by three other Justices, implored the Court to treat the appeal as a
collateral attack under § 2255 or to treat the appeal as timely under a liberal construction
of the requirements in rule 37(a) (2). Id. at 533-34.
18 Of this, Chief Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
I am very much concerned about the treiendous load of post-conviction pro-
ceedings with which we are now faced .... Yet, to save my life, I cannot say
that if I were sitting on the Supreme Court I could conscientiously decide any
of these cases contrary to the manner in which they have been decided. We do,
not infrequently, find that in some of these post-conviction motions the accused
is in the right and that he has been denied such constitutional or other basic
rights as entitle him not only to raise the question after an appeal, but to obtain
the relief sought.
Letter from Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle to Walter L. Pope in Address by Walter L.
1966]
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Ohio, however, has neither the rules nor coram nobis with which
to temper denials of petitions under the new Ohio post-conviction
remedy statute. This factor would point to the need of liberal inter-
pretation of the Ohio Statutes to include the modes of relief that the
rules, coram nobis, and section 2255 altogether encompass for the fed-
eral prisoner. In absence of coram nobis and the rules, the federal judi-
ciary might well have given section 2255 such a liberal interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledges that the states must
provide adequate post-conviction relief to state prisoners,"9 and has
itself restricted section 2255 application only by tempering such
restriction with the liberal interchange of remedies provided by coram
nobis and the rules.
B. The Scope of Section 2255
It is from the cases dealing with the total federal battery of
remedies that the scope of section 2255 becomes apparent. The most
important avenues of relief emerge as section 2255, rule 35, and
coram nobis. Together they form the context of collateral attack.
In United States v. Hayman," the constitutionality of section
2255 was upheld by making it the equivalent of habeas corpus. The
lower court had held the section a nullity as an unconstitutional sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court found the
purpose of the section was to clear the clogged dockets of the district
courts in whose jurisdictions major federal penal institutions were
located, and facilitate the administration of post-conviction relief by
allowing determination of the claims in the sentencing court-the
jurisdiction which had control of the files and records, which was the
scene of the facts, and in which the witnesses resided.2 The Court
concluded that section 2255 "was passed at the instance of the Judi-
cial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in admin-
istering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. No-
where . . . do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights
of collateral attack upon their convictions." 2 Thus, finding the section
not a restriction upon habeas corpus, the Court stated that the sec-
Pope, "Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applications," 33 F.R.D. 409,
417-18 (1962).
19 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
20 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
21 Id. at 214-19. The Hayman opinion presents a full legislative history of § 2255.
For further comment on the history of § 2255, see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
(1963); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 179 (1958) (dissenting opinion). For a
history of habeas corpus see Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391, 399-426 (1963).
22 United States v. Hayman, supra note 20, at 219.
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tion's "sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in
habeas corpus by affording the same rights in another and more con-
venient form." 23 The Court also clarified the Judicial Conference
Reviser's note that "section 2255 was 'in the nature of' the coram
nobis writ in the sense that [it]. ...like coram nobis, is an inde-
pendent action brought in the court that entered judgment."24 The
scope of section 2255 was thus tied to the scope of habeas corpus.
And yet, section 2255 gives a broader remedy. Not only is release
from custody available through section 2255 proceedings, but the
prisoner can receive less drastic revision of sentence through vacating,
setting aside, or correcting the sentence.23
C. Need for Constitutional or Jurisdictional Error
Though the Court once limited the scope of section 2255 to en-
compass only constitutional questions or questions relating to the trial
courts' jurisdiction, earlier cases had allowed nonconstitutional and
nonjurisdictional questions of statutory construction to be reached on
collateral attack. The scope of section 2255 thus includes all three, i.e.,
constitutional, jurisdictional, and statutory interpretation questions.
In Hill v. United States,26 the Court defined the scope of section
2255 as a "remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previ-
ously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where
the prisoner was confined."2 This meant, then, that to be raisable by a
section 2255 motion, the error must be either jurisdictional or consti-
tutional, or an error that is "a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission incon-
sistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure."2
The requirement of the claim being constitutional or jurisdictional
needs some qualification. In an earlier case, Ladner v. United States,
29
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 221 n.36.
25 Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963).
26 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
27 Id. at 427.
28 Id. at 428. The Court, however, held that failure of the district court to follow
formal requirements of rule 32(a) in not affording the convicted defendant an oppor-
tunity to speak in his own behalf before sentencing (the "allocution" requirement) was
not error raisable by collateral attack. Id. at 426. For other cases dealing with the allocu-
tion requirement, see United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162 (1963); Andrews v. United
States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963); Machibrodo v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Green
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961).
29 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (on rehearing). Petitioner had been convicted on two
counts under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1965) of assaulting federal officers and was sentenced to
ten years on each count, to run consecutively. After the first sentence had been served,
1966"]
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the Court reached a question of statutory interpretation on collateral
attack. There the Court said that "the availability of a collateral rem-
edy is not a jurisdictional question in the sense that, if not properly
raised, this Court should nevertheless determine it sua sponte. 30
The Court thus distinguished two meanings of jurisdiction: the
first referring to jurisdiction with regard to the trial court; the second
meaning referring to jurisdiction of the appellate court to hear the
collateral attack. Hill correctly stated that there is a jurisdictional
requirement in the sense that the question must involve either a con-
stitutional question or a question which involves the jurisdiction of
the trial court. Ladner demonstrates that this meaning of jurisdiction
does not include the prisoner's conferring jurisdiction on the appellate
court by using the proper remedy to correct the abuse. Ladner also
recognizes the equitable need to shift among the remedies to reach
the merits of a substantial claim. The jurisdictional ground was thus
defined in Ladner to be that the trial court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence; and the statute was not intended to be a juris-
dictional requirement in the procedural sense of properly raising the
collateral attack. That is, the remedy is not to be denied because of
the prisoner's failure to give the court jurisdiction over his claim by
improperly raising or omitting to raise it in the lower courts. This is
in keeping with the liberal attitude toward interchangeability of the
remedies noted earlier.
In Ladner, statutory construction was neither a constitutional nor
jurisdictional question. Since the government had not raised the ob-
jection of statutory construction being outside the scope of collateral
attack, the Court stated: "We, therefore, proceed to construe... [the
statute] without, however, intimating any view as to the availability
of a collateral remedy in another case where that question [scope] is
properly raised, and is adequately briefed and argued in this Court."'"
Ladner thus reached a question of statutory construction which did
not meet the jurisdictional or constitutional requirement of Hill. The
scope of section 2255 was thus expanded to include statutory con-
struction. The dissent in Ladner incorrectly attempted to restrict the
scope of collateral attack by stating: "a collateral attack can be made
petitioner moved under § 2255 to correct the second sentence, claiming he had fired but
one shot which had struck two officers and that this violated the statute but once. The
Court was thus called upon to interpret whether the statute authorized two convictions
for one act or not.
30 Id. at 172-73.
31 Id. at 173. The dissenting opinion correctly points out that "clearly this is an error
raisable by appeal. It did not undermine the jurisdiction of the original trial court ....
It raises no constitutional issue." Id. at 180.
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only where the error in the sentence is apparent from the facts alleged
in the four corners of the indictment or are admitted by the parties." 2
Surely it is the province of the rules to correct sentences in direct
attack. Rule 34 is intended to correct convictions where the "four
corners" of the indictment are faulty, 3 and rule 35 is intended to
correct illegal sentences where the error is apparent on the face of
the record. 4 It is to collateral attack that the prisoner must turn
when the error is dehors the record 5 Ladner, and the cases relied
upon by Ladner's majority, establish that statutory construction even
if nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional, is within the scope of col-
lateral attack and raisable by a section 2255 motion.36
However, Sunal v. Large37 stands for the proposition that the
error, if not a question of statutory construction or jurisdiction of the
real course, must be constitutional to be raisable.38 The Court stated:
An endeavor is made to magnify the error in these trials to con-
stitutional proportions by asserting that the refusal of the proffered
evidence robbed the trial of vitality by depriving defendants of their
only real defense. But as much might be said of many rulings during
32 Id. at 182.
33 See United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1949).
34 Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
35 Ibid.
36 See Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958). Based upon this restricted view
of collateral attack, the dissent in Ladner distinguishes the cases relied upon by the
majority as cases in which either the error was apparent on the face of the indictment
or the facts were admitted. The dissent attempts to distinguish the cases because in
Ladner there had to be an evidentiary hearing to determine how many shots the prisoner
did fire. 358 U.S. at 181. The only difference between Ladner and the other cases and the
only reason why the hearing would have to be held, is that Ladner's trial was "not tran-
scribed [and] it will be necessary at the hearing on the motion to reconstruct the trial
record" [358 U.S. at 1792; otherwise, the controverted facts would appear in the record
and no more need be done than in the others. There appears to be little justification for
distinguishing the cases. The dissent's reliance on Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947),
where it was stated: 'Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against
such a course [habeas corpus attack where the issue could have been, but was not, raised
on appeal], at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of the
defendant nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court" lId. at 181-82], is misplaced.
Sunal did not involve a question of statutory construction, rather the complaint was the
trial court's refusal to allow defendants the opportunity to present a defense which the
Court classified as an error of law [Id. at 182] but not such error as to amount to denial
of procedural due process.
37 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
38 In Sunal the trial court incorrectly refused to allow the defendant conscientious
objectors to show that their selective service classifications were involved in prosecutions
for refusing to submit to inductions. They took no appeal. The Court differentiated this
type of refusal to admit evidence as improperly excluding a defense from a constitutional
question.
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a criminal trial. Defendants received throughout an opportunity to
be heard and enjoyed all procedural guarantees granted by the Con-
stitution. Error in ruling on the question of law did not infect the
trial with lack of procedural due process.39
Hence, the Court though liberal in interchanging the remedies in
order to reach the merits of a substantial claim, attempted to show
the area of constitutional questions raisable. Simply raising questions
of constitutional stature, however, is not an automatic path to collateral
attack. In Hodges v. United States,40 petitioner, by implication, claimed
his confession was coerced, but had not taken an appeal.4 1 The Court
found the petition frivolous without passing upon the lower court's
basis for denial that "no appeal" barred collateral relief. As the dissent
in Hodges points out collateral relief is available when a constitu-
tional question is presented if the petition is not frivolous, whether or
not appeal is taken. In Jordan v. United States42 the lower court had
held failure to appeal barred collateral attack even though petitioner
raised a constitutional question. The Supreme Court reversed in a
memorandum decision.43 This, the dissent in Hodges correctly states,
stands for the proposition that "the constitutional issue, though not
raised at trial or on appeal, as could have been done, could be raised
in a § 2255 proceeding."44 This is true even if the prisoner pleaded
guilty though his constitutional rights were violated.4"
Thus, to attack a sentence collaterally by a section 2255 motion,
the prisoner must raise questions concerning either the constitution-
ality of the proceedings in which he was convicted, the jurisdiction of
the trial court, or interpretation of the statute.
III. STANDING
The scope of section 2255 being linked to the scope of habeas
corpus has ramifications other than the questions that are properly pre-
sentable on the specific grounds raisable. The question of standing to
invoke the remedy is also tied to the habeas corpus standards. It is
here, also, that the availability of other remedies has meaning.
39 Sunal v. Large, 332 US. 174, 182 (1947).
40 368 U.S. 139 (1961).
41 Hodges v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
42 233 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
43 Jordan v. United States, 352 U.S. 904 (1956) (memorandum decision).
44 Hodges v. United States, supra note 40, at 142. For other cases where no appeal
was taken and § 2255 motion was allowed, see Hill v. United States, 368 US. 424 (1962);
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961).




The liberality in interchanging remedies has given the federal prisoner
a genuine mode to relief. The statute speaks in terms of a "prisoner in
custody" attacking his conviction by way of a section 2255 motion 6
Though the Supreme Court has not passed upon all the various situa-
tions in which federal prisoners find themselves, it has, along with the
lower federal courts, decided many of the possible contexts of "cus-
tody" and furnished analogies for others. The situations identified
below include the lightest touch of "custody"-where the prisoner has
already served the sentence-and the most ambiguous-where the
prisoner is out on bail.
A. Where the Sentence Has Been Served
The custody requirement of section 2255 is not met where the
sentence has been served. But the unavailability of this motion does
not preclude judicial relief through other collateral remedies.
In United States v. Morgan47 the petitioner had pleaded guilty to
a federal charge, had served his federal sentence, and was in custody
under a state sentence. The state sentence imposed was longer since
petitioner was a second offender with a prior federal conviction. Peti-
tioner served a writ of error coram nobis to void his federal conviction
for failure to furnish counsel. The district court treated it as a motion
under section 2255 and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because
petitioner was no longer in custody.48 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that section 2255 did not cover the entire field of remedies4"
and that, even without specific statutory authority, the common law
writ of error coram nobis was available to correct errors of fact
"without limitation of time for facts that affect the 'validity and reg-
ularity' of the judgment."" Post-conviction relief is thus available to
correct a sentence already served, though the section 2255 motion is
not proper.5 1
In Pollard v. United States,52 where the petitioner had been re-
leased from federal prison while certiorari was pending, the Court
held "the possibility of consequences collateral to the imposition of
sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the
46 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1965).
47 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
4s Id. at 504.
49 Id. at 511.
Go Id. at 507.
51 See United States v. Lavelle, 194 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1952) (section 2255 motion
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under similar facts).
52 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
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merits."5 3 Thus, collateral attack under section 2255 was held avail-
able though the prisoner was no longer in "custody." But, three years
later the Court in Parker v. Ellis,54 denied the same relief to a state
prisoner seeking habeas corpus. There the petitioner was released from
the state penitentiary pending certiorari and the Court held the case
to be moot and the Court to be without jurisdiction. Relying on Heflin
v. United States,55 a case dealing with consecutive sentences, the
Parker Court said of the Pollard case: "It is likewise true that 'a
motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ... is available only to
attack a sentence under which a prisoner is in custody.' . . . contrary
to the unconsidered assumption in Pollard v. United States. . ..",
Though the Chief Justice argued in an artful dissent that Pollard and
Heflin were reconcilable because they dealt with different situations,
and though Mr. Justice Douglas premised his dissent upon the belief
that if this were a federal prisoner relief could be granted on the basis
of Pollard, it would seem that Parker does undermine Pollard.57 And in
light of Morgan's holding of the availability of coram nobis, Pollard-
type relief seems somewhat unnecessary.
It would thus seem that having been given an adequate course of
relief through coram nobis, the federal prisoner may no longer use a
section 2255 motion to correct a sentence where he is no longer in
custody. The engrafting of the habeas corpus standards onto the sec-
tion 2255 motion would clearly point to this result.
-B. Consecutive Sentences
In contrast to the cases where the petitioner has already served
his sentence and is given some form of relief, cases exist which deal
with attacks upon consecutive sentences not yet begun to be served.
Where the prisoner has not yet begun to serve the sentence to be
attacked because it does not begin until the expiration of the one he
is presently serving, he has not met the custody requirement of
section 2255. As in the cases where the sentence has already been
served, however, there is some form of relief available. The prisoner
can correct an illegal sentence he is not yet serving by motion under
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure if the error appears
on the face of the record. Where the error is dehors the record, coram
nobis is still available. This is what the Chief Justice addressed him-
53 Id. at 358.
54 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
55 358 U.S. 415 (1959). This case will be discussed later in the section dealing with
consecutive sentences.
56 Parker v. Ellis, 362 US. 574, 575 (1960).
57 See Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962).
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self to in his dissent in Parker, differentiating the petitioner's being out
of custody in the Pollard case from the petitioner's having never been
in custody because he had not yet begun to serve the sentence he
attacks. Yet, it is a contrast without a difference, for relief of some
sort is available to the federal prisoner depending upon the status
of his complaint.
The rule against allowing the prisoner to attack a consecutive
sentence he has not begun to serve was found early in the habeas
corpus decisions. Thus, in McNally v. Hill,"8 where the petitioner was
serving the second of three consecutive sentences and had brought
habeas corpus to attack the third conviction, the Court said, "without
restraint of liberty the writ will not issue. . . . Equally, without re-
straint which is unlawful, the writ may not be used. A sentence which
the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be the cause of restraint
which the statute makes the subject of inquiry."59
The lower courts were not uniform in their application of the
McNally rule to section 2255 motions. The most enduring of the
lower court cases on this point is Crow v. United States,60 where the
court, in interpreting section 2255, held that the words "at any time"
were controlled by the words "in custody." The court there said that
"it is apparent that 'at any time' means at any time the prisoner is in
custody under the sentence which he attacks."'" The court in denying
relief concluded that "a prisoner serving the first of two consecutive
sentences is not serving the second."162 The District of Columbia Circuit
differentiated the Crow rule in Holloway v. United States,"3 because in
Holloway the first of the two consecutive sentences was indeterminate,
whereas in Crow both sentences were for a time certain. The court
said: "The minimum time of the first sentence has now expired. It
would be unfortunate to disregard the realities of the situation."
64
The court then referred to rule 35 in its connection with section 2255:
If the trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time,
certainly a defendant has a right to move the court at any time for
a declaration that a sentence is illegal. We do not believe that in
employing the phrase "a prisoner in custody under sentence," Con-
58 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
59 Id. at 138.
60 186 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1950). Crow was not, however, followed on another point,
i.e., refusal to allow a motion under § 2255 to be treated as a motion under rule 32(d).
See Young v. United States, 337 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
61 Crow v. United States, supra note 60, at 705.
62 Id. at 706.
63 191 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
64 Id. at 507.
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gress intended to limit the court's authority for correcting illegal
sentences... to those cases where defendants have actually started
serving the sentences. We believe the intent of both the statute and
the rule is to permit the filing of a motion to correct an allegedly
illegal sentence at any time regardless of whether or not execution
of the sentence has commenced.6 5
The Supreme Court passed on the situation when presented with
the Crow-type time certain-consecutive sentences in Heflin v. United
States." The Court upheld the Crow rule, but tempered it with Hollo-
way considerations of rule 35 holding that section 2255 is available
only to attack a sentence under which a prisoner is in custody, but
adding that "relief under Rule 35 . . . is available (at least where
matters dehors the record are not involved), the only question here
being whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face. 67
Though the petitioner's motion under section 2255 was not within
the time prescribed for a rule 35 motion, the Court dispensed with the
time requirement of rule 35 in order to reach the merits "to avoid
wasteful circuity."6 8 The Heflin case thus clarified the rule with regard
to consecutive sentences, not allowing a section 2255 motion to be
used, but granting relief under rule 35. This availability of some sort
of relief tempered the harshness of not allowing a section 2255 motion
to raise questions of illegality in sentences not yet begun to be served,
and the lower courts have followed the liberality in granting relief.6 9
But Heflin's use of rule 35 is no panacea for the federal prisoner.
The use of rule 35 was subsequently limited by Hill v. United States
to attacks on the illegality of the sentence itself as opposed to the broader
questions of the illegal manner in which the sentence was imposed. °
Thus Heflin left a gap where the error complained of relating to
the consecutive sentence yet to be served, was one dehors the record,
though it fulfilled the habeas corpus standard of going to the jurisdic-
65 Ibid.
66 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
67 Id. at 418.
66 Id. at 418 n.7.
69 See, e.g., Bayless v. United States, 288 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1961).
70 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described it in Johnson v. United States, 344
F.2d 401, 410 (5th Cir. 1965):
As to Rule 35, although the Supreme Court in Beffin appeared to open the door
to a reading of Rule 35 which would have allowed it to be used in a broad range
of cases falling without the ambit of § 2255, the door was subsequently closed
tight in Hill .... It was there stated: "But, as the Rule's language and history
make clear, the narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of
an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other pro-
ceedings prior to imposition."
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tion of the court or was a constitutional question. Rule 35 is restricted
to the face of the record and cannot reach matters dehors the record."'
This gap is filled,, however, by the availability of coram nobis which
Morgan had allowed. This was the relief the Fifth Circuit allowed in
Johnson v. United States72 when faced with Heflin and Hill, when it
found that through coram nobis "questions concerning the basic fair-
ness of a conviction may be raised both before and after a sentence has
been served.""3 In discussing the modes of relief presented by section
2255, rule 35, and coram nobis, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
said:
While Rule 35 and § 2255 undoubtedly provide overlapping
remedies, in that both authorize the correction of an illegal sentence,
Rule 35 authorizes the correction of an "illegal sentence at any
time," whether the correction results in the release of the prisoner
... or even though the petitioner has served his sentence .... The
Rule is available to correct errors of law appearing on the face of
the judgment, and the ancient writ of error coram nobis is available
to correct fundamental errors of fact.74
Therefore when the sentence has been served, the prisoner can
bring coram nobis. When the sentence is consecutive and not yet served,
rule 35 is available if the error is apparent on the face of the record;
and where dehors the record coram nobis affords relief.
There are other situations in which the prisoner finds himself
which differ from the already served and consecutive sentence prob-
lems. In Russell v. United States,7 the prisoner had served the sen-
tence he was attacking, but was still in custody under consecutive
sentences imposed in the same case. The Ninth Circuit granted section
2255 relief holding that "where the first of two or more consecutive
sentences imposed is asserted to be invalid, the prisoner will be deemed
to have been first confined under the admittedly valid sentence or
sentences." ' This presumption avoids any problems in shifting among
writs, motions, and rules.
Where the prisoner elected not to commence serving his sentence
pending an appeal, and thus was not yet in custody, section 2255 relief
was available as "the appeal is therefore deemed to have been aban-
doned."177 But where the prisoner was still in state custody and the
71 See Heflin v. United States, 358 US. 415, 418 (1959).
72 Supra note 70.
73 Ibid.
74 Scarpon v. United States, 313 F.2d 950, 952 (10th Cir. 1963).
75 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962).
78 Id. at 405.
77 Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38, 41 (9th Cir. 1959).
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federal sentence he was attacking was to begin upon completion of
the state confinement, a section 2255 motion was held to be "pre-
mature.""' Yet, even in this situation, in an appropriate case, rule 35
or coram nobis would be available. 9
C. Pardon, Probation, and Parole
Differing amounts of the restraining forces of custody cause dif-
ferent results. A pardon bars relief under section 2255 because the
custody requirement is not met. This is true also of probation. But
other relief, in the form of coram nobis, is probably available. Parole,
on the other hand, is sufficient custody to give the court jurisdiction
to reach the merits. When the petitioner was pardoned by the Presi-
dent, his motion under section 2255 to expunge the record was held to
allege no facts that would give the court jurisdiction. 0 It is probable,
however, that petitioner could have gotten the relief he sought through
coram nobis, for in United States v. Bradford," where the petitioner
received a suspended sentence and probation, even though the court
held that a section 2255 motion did not lie for lack of custody,
petitioner had his claim decided on the merits in a subsequent petition
for a writ or error coram nobis 2 The availability of coram nobis
would thus remove the harshness of leaving intact a completed con-
viction, for as the Chief Justice observed in his dissent in Parker:
"conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not
only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil
disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his reputation and
economic opportunities."83 In Callanan v. United States,"" the Supreme
Court reached the merits of petitioner's claim on motion under rule 35,
though petitioner's sentence was suspended and he was placed on
probation.
The court in Bradford had observed that petitioner "might have
been in a position to review his conviction by habeas corpus or section
2255, if he had been paroled"85 for "a convict, paroled under Chapter
311 of Title 18 U.S.C., is in 'legal custody,' because section 4203
78 Ellison v. United States, 263 F.2d 395, 396 (10th Cir. 1959).
79 See Young v. United States, 337 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
80 Viles v. United States, 193 F.2d 776 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952).
81 194 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
945 (1954).
82 United States v. Bradford, 272 P.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959).
88 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960).
8 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
85 United States v. Bradford, supra note 81, at 200.
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expressly so declares.""6 In Jones v. Cunningham,7 the petitioner
brought habeas corpus against the state sentence from which he had
been paroled. The Supreme Court, using a common law test, concluded
that habeas corpus would lie to test the conviction, though the prisoner
was on parole."8 Thus, with Bradford and Jones so decided, there can
be little doubt that parole is no bar to bringing a section 2255 motion
to test a conviction.
D. Bail
The Court had early held that one out on bail could not use habeas
corpus for his release. In Johnson v. Hoy 9 the Court said: "He is no
longer in the custody of the marshal to whom the writ is addressed,
and from whose custody he seeks to be discharged. The defendant is
now at liberty, and having secured the very relief which the writ of
habeas corpus was intended to afford ... the appeal must be dis-
missed."8 0 This has been the continuing habeas corpus rule.91 In
Matysek v. United States,92 the Ninth Circuit decided the rule applied
to section 2255 motions. In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court
86 Ibid.
87 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
88 The Court said at 240-43:
History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprison-
ment, there are other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the
public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking
world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.. . . The custody and control of
the [state] Parole Board involve significant restraints on petitioner's liberty
because of his conviction and sentence.... It is not relevant that conditions and
restrictions such as these may be desirable and important parts of the rehabilita-
tive process; what matters is that they significantly restrain petitioner's liberty
to do those things which in this country free men are entitled to do. Such
restraints are enough to invoke the help of the Great Writ. Of course, that writ
always could and still can reach behind prison walls and iron bars. But it can do
more. It is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy;
its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals
against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their
liberty. While petitioner's parole releases him from immediate physical imprison-
ment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom;
this is enough to keep him in the "custody" of the Virginia Parole Board within
the meaning of the habeas corpus statute....
89 227 US. 245 (1913).
90 Id. at 248.
91 See, e.g., Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 307 (1946). But see MacKenzie v.
Barrett, 141 Fed. 964 (7th Cir. 1905).
92 339 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Allen v. United States, 349 F.2d 362 (1st
Cir. 1965).
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gave the history of collateral attacks when the petitioner was out on
bail, and concluded that the district court was without jurisdiction
to consider the merits. 93 The court hinted that rule 3594 and coram
nobis95 would be available under appropriate circumstances. Neither
habeas corpus nor section 2255 would be proper to attack bail as exces-
sive; the proper procedure is a motion for reduction of bail and an
appeal from an order denying such motion."
CONCLUSION
The federal judiciary has made section 2255 a viable remedy
for redressing trial abuses by reading it in context with other available
federal remedies and liberally allowing the interchange of the remedies,
after the issues have been drawn, to effect the needed result of reach-
ing the merits of substantial claims of abuse. Since Ohio does not have
the same context into which its new post-conviction remedy statute
can be injected, a more liberal reading of its procedure may be
required to give the state process similar relief-giving potential. Sec-
tion 2255 has been tied to habeas corpus standards, though the relief
given by section 2255 need not be so drastic as in habeas corpus: the
prisoner can seek other than complete discharge through section 2255;
he can seek revision or correction of his sentence. Yet habeas corpus
standards do apply with regard to questions such as standing, where
custody is a requisite to relief. The purpose of the federal statute was
to shift the burden of heavy traffic in relief-seeking by federal
prisoners to a more convenient forum. Some states, on the other
hand, need measures such as section 2255, not so much to merely
shift the work load among courts, but to, in effect, begin giving relief
where it was denied on technical grounds before. For this reason
states, such as Ohio, with new post-conviction relief statutes may have
the need to go beyond the federal model in order to effectively supple-
ment their criminal jurisprudence.
Zel Canter
93 Matysek v. United States, supra note 92, at 395.
94 Ibid.
95 Id. at 392. See also Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), where
the court treated a petition under § 2255 as a writ of error coram nobis and granted relief.
96 Stuck v. Boyle, 342 US. 1 (1951).
